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1' whole, defies simple measurement. Their share in total residential
construction and mortgage lending docs not take account of their
far-reaching indirect influences on building types inresidential
construction, land planning in new subdivisions, the structureof
the housebiiilding industry, the extent of home ownership,general
lending practices, sources of funds, terms of conventional mort-
gages, and other facetsof this complex business. Only a few of
the implications of the governmental activities areselected for
discussion here - those which have a hearing on the future course
of capital formation and financing in this field.
An appraisal of the future role of federal credit aids must con-
cern itself with at leastthree questions:
Does the observed increase in scope and intensity offederal
aids since 1935 suggest a trend, or is it perhaps moreadequately
explained as a response to temporary pressures andmaladjust-
ments in housing markets?
Are there limits to the effectiveness of present meansof
federal assistance, and if so, what are thealternatives?
If the assumption of a trend is warranted, what consequences
will arise for the volume and stability ofcapital formation and
financing in this field?
In considering these questions, the investigatorshifts from the
relatively secure ground of historical analysis to a moretreacherous
field, where judgment plays a larger role; andhis only qualifica-
tion at this point is perhaps the development,through training
and experience, of art attitude that should assurejudicious con-
sideration of all relevant factors and minimizeif not prevent the
injection of his own biases.
A Trend?
Each of the federal credit aids for privateresidential construction
had a special justification when it wasestablished. The mortgage
insurance program of the FHA was enactedoriginally in response
to "pump-priming" considerationsand the need for improvements
in the mortgage system. The principal stepstoward more liberal
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credit terms for FFIA-jnsurcdloans were taken tomeet crises itt
war housing and to help relievethe postwar housingshortage. The guarantee ofveterans home loatis was adoptedas part of a
program to ease the adjustment ofex-scrvicernen to civilian life.
The use of the FederalNational MortgageAssociation forprac.. tically directgovernment lending operationswas authorized as a
stop-gap solution when thesupply of mortgage funds forFHA and
VA loans at fixed interestrates threatened to diminish.'
One might thus be ledto believe that many ifnot all of these
operations could be withdrawnif their originalpurposes were served or no majoremergencies arose. However,here as in the
interpretation of otherevents, it is necessary todistinguish sharply between the incidentsthat give rise to politicalactions and the
more deep-seated forces that underliethe actions.
Basjcall, the developmentof federal aids for housing,compris- irig not only theactivities analyzed in thispaper but also public
housing and assistance inurban redevelopment,must be viewed
as part of a long-term social changewhich vests housingconditions, and not only those of thepoor and indigent, with broadand prob-
ably intensifying publicinterest This changeseems to reflect basic
attitudes of thecommunityatlarge although itsintensity and,
therefore, the pace and formof federalprograms may vary over
time and in differentpolitical and economic climates.2This broad
concept was recognized byCongress in the "Declarationof Na-
tional Housing Policy,"which forms thepreamble to the Housing
Act of 1949. It isreflected in theorganizational assembly of all
federal agenciesconcerned with housing andcredit for housing
(except the VeteransAdministration) in the Housingand Home
Finance Agency; and whilethe organization of federalagencies is subject to change, it isunlikely that the forcespulling in the direc-
tion of an over-all federalstrategy on housing activitieswill abate in the longrun.
'For a more detailedaccount, see Mile, L. Colean, op. cit.
It is of interest to note inthis Connection that the platform,of the Democratic and Republican parties for1944, 1948, and 1952 donot tnuch at all upon the FHA mortgage insuranceand VA home loanguarantee programs or on the operations of the Federal NationalMortgage Association. Incontrast, they differ substantiallyon public housing and slumclearance and redevelopment whenever these itemsappear.
56The use of federal credit aids as tools in a broad program to
improve housing conditions is supported by the still broader,
widely accepted social objective of maintaining reasonably full
employment It is almost inconceivable that aids to housing pro-
duction will not be incorporated in programs to combat unem-
ployment if and when the time for such programs comes. In fact,
existing aids will most probably be intensified and supplemented
under such conditions, or they will be extended beyond their orig-
inal expiration date. Such a contingency, for example, may affect
the termination of the home loan program for veterans of World
War II, now zcheduled for 1957.
The employment of federal credit aids is supported also by a
widely held notion that the housebuilding "industry," however
defined, is backward in comparison with other industries meeting
essential consumers' needs. In this view, new housing historically
has been a luxury product available only to the upper income
groups, and government action is necessary to compensate for
the apparent inability of the industry to meet the need for houses
of good standards within the reach of every family, or the average
family, or however the "need" may be defined.8
The "trend" suggested by these observations is strengthened
by the conviction of strategic groups that continued government
aids are indispensable to effective operation of the processes by
which new housing is built and marketed. Critical issues during
the past few years provide vivid illustrations. One is the tcrmina-
tion in 1945 of the wartime Title VI of the National Housing Act,
'This viewpoint permeates much of the housing literature of the past 20 years,
goveinment reports, and Congressional deliberations. Cf. U. S. Congress, Inves-
tigation of Concentration of Economic Power, Temporary National Economic
CommitteeMonograph No. 8, Toward More Housing (76 Cong., 3 Seas.)
and Hearings before the Temporary National Economic Committee (76 Cong.,
1 Scsi.), Part 11, Construction Industry, 1940; Charles Abrams, The Future
of Housing (Harper & Brothers, 1946), Chapters 5, 13; Robert Lasch, Breaking
the Building Blockade (University of Chicago Press, 1946), pp. 7-10; and
numerous statements in Hearings before the Committee on Banking and
Currency on S. 1592 (79 Cong., 1 Sets.); Housing: Hearings before the Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on S. 287. S. 866, S. 701, S. 801, S. 802,
S. 803, and S. 804 (80 Cong., 1 Sets.), passim. See also High Cost of Housing:
Report of a Subcommittee of the Joint Committee on Housing (80 Cong.,
2 Sess., House Document Na. 647, 1948); and Nathan Straus, Two Thirds
of a Nation (Alfred A. Knopf, 1952).
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with its "firmcommitments"to buildersand itsgenerousfinancing terms, and itsre-enactment in slightlymodified formin 1946after a short lapse, aspart of thevetcranemergcn4.y housing
program.4 Another is theliberalization in1950 offinancingterms forrental and cooperativehousing projectsunder TitleIi of thisAct when Section 608, designedto encouragerentalconstructjojiuliderwar and postwarconditions, wasallowed toeXpire.aA thirdis the increase in 1950 ofthe guarantyforveterans homeloans from50 per cent of the loanamount notexceeding$4,000to 0per cent not exceeding $7,500,plus an extensionof themaximummaturity from 25 to 30years - a revisionthat followedthe fallingoff in the volume ofthese loans in1948 and1949 andone whichcon- tributed to thespectacular increaseof housingstarts in 1950.Still another exampleis the 1951liberalization by
Congressionalaction of housingcredit restrictionsimposed in1950 under
Congres.. sional authority.
In all the.siinstances, consumers'and builders'andsometimes mortgage lendinginterests combinedto producedemands formore potent federalaids whena decline inthe volumeof building occurred orthreatened. Theapparent dependenceon the federal programs developedunder conditionswhich, onthe whole,were favorable toa high level ofresidentialbuilding activity.It will unquestionablybe fi1tmore acutely when
circumstancesare less favorable. Undersuchcircumstances,any diminutionof aids would beconsidered widelyto be a calamity,and completewith- drawal wouldbe held tospell disaster- regardless ofwhat the real asdistinguished fromthe anticipatedimpact ofwithdrawal may be.
War andpostwar dislocations
unquestionablyaccelerated the scope of government
activities in thisfield, but itwouldseem more reasonable toanticipatea continued andgrowing role ofthe fed- eralgovernment thanto expecta diminutionor withdrawal of aids in thelong run. This"trend" willnot necessarilyapply to the 'Public Law388, Chapter268, (79 Cong.,2 Sess.). 'Public Law475, Chapter94, (81 Cong.,2 Sess.). 'ibid.
'Public Law139, Chapter378, (82 Cong.,1 Sess.).
58FHA mortgage insurance system or the VA home loan guarantee
program as they now stand. The share of FHA financing in new
construction may itot exceed 30 or 40 per cent unless there is a
war or the relative attractiveness of FHA loans is drastically
changed, and the importance of VA financing may diminish as
distance from World War II increases. In fact, there seemto be
narrow limits to the intensification of these aids in the future, as
will be pointed out below, and the trend toward a greater role of
the federal government in residential construction and its financ-
ing may express itself in the use of new financial devices.
Limits to Present Types of Aids
If the assumption of a "trend" is warranted, what are the limits
to the use of the present types of aids, and what arc the probable
alternatives?
This question is perhaps most pertinent if declining employment
and incomes are assumed. For it is in such a situation that the
demands for increased federal aids will become most pronounced.
The record of experience is not instructive on this point since the
federal programs so far have operated on a broadly rising market.
Little is known about how the demand for new construction
responds to changes in credit terms during the downward phase
of a cycle. How much would the demand for new housing be
stimulated if, under conditions of falling incomes, terms under a
government mortgage insurance program were changed from,
say, a 10 per cent minimum downpayment to zero downpayment,
a 25-year maximum maturity to 35 years, and 4 per cent interest
to 3V2 per cent? Arithmetically, this change would produce a
monthly mortgage carrying charge (level-payment) of $4.13 per
$1,000 of purchase price of a single-family house, as against $4.75
before. The reduction in loan payments would be 13 per cent but
the decline in total monthly outlays for housing would be much
less, perhaps only 6 to 8 per cent; for real estate tax, maintenance,
heating, and other operational expenses would not be affected by
the decline in mortgage payments. The complete elimination of
downpayment may be a stimulating factor when consumers as
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well as business firms preferliquidity. Butcash Outlaysofseveral hundred dollars would still berequired for Closing
Costs, additjonaj landscaping, and other incidentalexpenses usually
assocjatcd with house purchase, even in theabsence of downpayments;
and Uncer.. tainty would still discourage theundertaking of fixed
COfllmjtlnents The extension of maturitieswill have rapidly
diminishingeffect8 on mortgage carrying chargescompared to theeffects ofpast actions in this direction. Theamount by which
monthly level payments arc reduced when thematurity of a 4per cent loanis extended from 30 to 40years is 59 Centsper $1,000 ofloan,as against1.29 for an extensionfrom 20 to 30years. Theper cent reduction is littleover 12 per centcompared to 21per cent.° Moreover, the large supplyin a fallingmarket of CXisting
hous-. ing at declining pricesor rents, often in thenature of distresssales or rentals, would limit the volumeof new housingthat couldbe marketed even at greatlyliberalized credittel-ms. Anannual pro- duction of one milliondwelling units, forexample equalslittle more than 2 per cent of thenumber of existingnonfarn dwelling unitsabout 42 million in 1952.If onlyone-tenth of theexisting supply were offeredat distress pricesor rents thequantity of old dwelling units comingon the market would befour timesas large as the volume of newconstructiona Competing supplywhich would reduce themarketability of new housing
even though the latter may bemore attractive both in physicalcharacte,.jsjand in liberal debt-financing.
Limits would also existin the supply of fundsfor mortgage loans by private institutions.The insurance ofbank depositsand of accounts in savings and loanassociations might relievepressure that would otherwiseaccentuate the liquiditypreference of finan- cial institutions. Butwhether protection fromruns on deposits and
mortgage insurance would inducelenders to Continue thefinanc-
Cf. Ernest M. Fisher,Urban Real Estate Markets:Characteristics and Financing (National Bureauof Economic Research, 1951),pp. 71-2. For a general discussIon of the effectsof changes of loan terms ininstalment financ- ing, sen also Aveam Kisselgoff,Factors Affecting the Demand/ot Consume,,' Instalment Sale, Credit (TechnicalPaper 7, National Bureau ofEconomic Research, 1952).
Distress prices or rentsmay be defined as those which reflect theactual or anticipated eiminatjon of equitiesthrough foreclosure.
60ing of new construction in the face of rising vacancies, defaults,
anti foreclosures is an open question.
Apart from higher interest rates there is little leeway left for
making investments in insured or guaranteed mortgages more
attractive under unfavorable business conditions. Further induce-
nients might he covering more or all of the risks still left with the
mortgagee (such as the excess of foreclosure costs over the maxi-
mum covered by FHA and liberalization of the "waste provisions"
under which the mortgagee bears the risk of unusual damage to
property after institution of foreclosure proceedings), or in making
the interest rate and terms of FHA debentures exchanged for
foreclosed properties more attractive.10 In the case of VA loans,
the maximum amounts and percentages of the guaranty could
again be raised. The effectiveness of these inducements must be
weighed against the conditions that would create caution and
reluctance in lending on new construction.
If there are narrow limits to the effectiveness of more intensive
use of mortgage insurance programs under conditions of business
contraction, demands for "stronger medicine" will undoubtedly
develop. The direction of any attempts to meet them can be in-
ferred from scattered examples already on the record. Among these
is the direct home loan program of the Veterans Administration.
now of small magnitude and on legal maximum terms identical
with those of private mortgage lenders making VA loans. Another
is the Connecticut program under which the State Housing Author-
ity grants direct mortgage loans at I '/ per cent interest with a
maximum maturity of 25 to 30 years. These loans are serviced by
mortgage lending institutions at the usual fee of 0.5 per cent. The
state funds are obtained by short-term borrowing.11 A third ex-
ample is the New York City program of rental housing without
cash subsidies, designed for income groups above the admission
limits for public housing with cash subsidies.12 In this case, rentals
'° For an instructive discussion of these points, see Mon gage Financing, Hear-
ings before the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, (62 Cong., 2
Sess.).
u Chester Bowles, "The Role of the States," in Nathan Straus, Two l'kirds of
a Nation (Alfred A. Knopf, 1952), pp. 236 11.
' Annual Reports of the New York City Housing Authority, 1949.1951.
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kare set to meet a debt chargebased on low-cost,
tax-exemptpublic financing, as wellas operating costsand (reduced)
charges in lieu of real eate -s. Various schemesalong similarlines have been enacted in otherstates. Finally,as was pointed
out before, the Federal NationalMortgage Associationprovidesan instrument that can be used forprimary lendingon nonmarket
terms even though private lendinginstitutionS mightoriginate and
.SCIVICC the loans.
If these observationsare correct, theboundariesbetween"pri- vate" and "public"residentialconstructionwould becomeless determinate. To date,the term "publichousing" hasbeenreserved broadly for theprograms under whichpublic capitalfundsor sub- sidies are madcavailable forprojects ownedand managedby public agencies.The record ofEuropean housingsince World War I is repletewitharrangements underwhich thedistinction between privateand publichousing is difficultif notimpossible to maintain. It isat least conceivablethat forcesat work inthis country point in thesame direction.
Consequences brCapitalFormation andFinancing
On the whole,past and projected
federal policiesin this fieldmay be interpretedas efforts to raise
permanently theproportion of total resourcesdevoted to housing
construction abovethe level that would heobtained fromthe interplayof marketforces. Tothe extent that theefforts succeed,new residential
construction will he maintainedat a highervolume thanwould he possiblewithout existing andprospectivegovernment aids.
Enough hasbeen saidabout theuncertainties ofconsumers' reactions tomore liberal creditterms to indicatethat the quantita- tive effectsare unpredictable.Moreover,government aid willbe only one ofmany factorsconditioning thefuturecourse of resi- dential building.No comprehensiveappraisal oflong-term pros- pects for capitalformation in thisfield is possiblewithout analysis of all factorswhich seemrelevant accordingto past performance. Such an analysiswill heattempted in theforthcoming monograph. In themeantime, however,it is possibleto sketchsome of the prob-
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63implied assurance ofmore stable productionmay foster rather than retard progress. Suchan assurance will bemore effect iveif the past practice of short-termand last-minutechangesn housing legislation is modified. Thispractice has sometimescreatedunce- tainties no less aggravatingto builders andmortgage tendersthan the uncertainties of marketforces.
The timing of federal aidsin any form wit)assume increasing significance ii their influenceon the volume ofresidentialcon- struction becomesmore pronounced. In thefirst place,timing will have a bearingon the effectiveness of aidsin meetingthe objec- tive of a larger, sustainedvolume of residential
construction in price and rentalranges within the reach ofa wider segmentof the population. Second, thegeneral economic andfiscal implications of federal housingprograms will need to beconsidered. It is instructive inthis connectionto examine therecord of experience in the timingof governmentaids to datea record covering more than 15years.
A review of thisrecord dampensany expectation thatproper timing of federal creditaids might moderatethe violence oflong swings in residentialconstruction. The policyof expansionof fed- eral credit aids andliberalization of creditterms, inaugurateddur- ing the late thirtiesin a period of mwconstruction volumeand low prices and rents farexisting residentialreal estate,was continued and intensifiedduring the postwaryears when pressureson all resources and particularlyconstructionresources were great and prices risingor high.
"There has beenlittle recognitionin federal policyof the funda- mental differencein the effects ofliberal creditduring periods of substantialunderutilization ofresources and duringperiods of full employmentor overemployment ofresources. During the thirties, ofcourse, it was possiblethrough liberal creditto stimulate the demand forhousing withoutsubstantial rise inthe cost of, and the pricefor, newdwellings. The largeunusedresources for construction couldhe brought hackinto employmentwithout bidding upwages and materialsprices. Moreover,the market for existing houseswas a buyers' marketin most areas andlocalities, and the largenumber of suchhouses offered forsale at distressor
64near-distress prices served as a check on prices for new dwellings.
When the volume of new construction is limited by materials and
laboi' supply and a sellers' market prevails for existinghouses, as
was the case fromVJ-day to late in 1948, liberal credit is likely
to push up costs and prices ratherthan to increase production,
i.e., to be inflationary.'"6
There is evidence that in a sellers' market more generouscredit
terms were eventually capitalizedinto higher house prices and
larger loan amounts, which diminished the benefitsof lower interest
rates, longer amortizationperiods, and lower or no downpayment
rcquireincnts.Liberalization of credit under these conditions
tended to defeat its purpose of helping lower income groups to
buy houses.
There may be some question whether the recordafter World
War II represents a fair test of the political andsocial difficulties
that beset a policy designed to bring greaterstability to residential
construction. The test has been limited to a postwarperiod in
which a severe housing shortage and theproblem of providing
housing for veterans created unusual pressures.Nevertheless, it
may be reasonable todraw this much of an inference: the fact
that housing has been increasingly clothedwith public interest
and that the volume of residential building issubject to strong
governmental influences does not of itself assure greaterstability.
A real conflict may exist between thesocial objective of economic
stability and the social objective of maximumvolume of housing
construction when there is full employment andgeneral pressure
on resources. In such asituation, "housing production cannot be
maximized without sacrifice of economicstability," and "economic
stability cannot be maintained withoutsacrifice of maximum
housing construction."7
Whatever the merits of this analysis asapplied to the years fol-
Leo Grebler, "Stabilizing ResidentialConstruction - A Review of the Post-
war Test," American EconomicReview XXXIX, No. 5, September 1949, pp.
901-2. On the relationship between credit termsand price levels, see also Ernest
M. Fisher, Urban Real Estate Markets, pp.69-90, and "The Role of Credit
in the Real Estate Market," address beforethe 41st Annual Meeting of the
American Life Convention in Chicago, October7-11, 1946.
Leo Grebler, o. cit., p. 906.
65lowing World War 11,the itced for meshingexisting aminew federal aids to residentialconstruCtion withgeneral fiscaland economic policy is becomingincreasinglyapparent. Itwas recog- nized iii the institutionof Regulation Xafter thc outbreakof the Korean hostilities andin accompanyingrestrictionson FHA and VA mortgageloans. The principleis also embodiedin thel)1ov sims of federal funds forurban redevelopmentand of federalcon- tributions for publichousing.18 But thetransformation ofprinciple into practical policyalways requiresstatesmanship inthe faceof social pressures and,more fundamentally,a balancing bythe com- munity-at-large ofreasonable expectationsof long.runbenefit against apparentor real short-termadvantages. 'I'hcsolution of this problem willin largemeasure determinewhether thegovern- ment's influenceon residentialconstruction willtend toward greater stability in thisimportant sector ofthe economy.
Finally, a trend towarda larger role of thefederalgovernment in the financingof residentialconstruction wouldloosen ifnot break the nexusbetween the savingsprocess and investmentin new residential realestate. Historically, theflow of fundsinto housing construction has beendetermined by theeconomic forcesaffecting the volume of savingsand the alternativeattractions ofdifferent types of investment,that is, new residential
construction hascom- peted with all otherpotential uses ofsavings. Whilethe insurance or guarantee of residentialmortgages has influencedtheir attrac- tiveness relativeto other investmentoutlets, directgovernment lending (alreadyforeshadowed in theoperations of theFederal National MortgageAssociation) wouldtend to divorcethe level of investment innew housingmore clearly from thelevel of savings and the competitionof other potentialuses of savings. Thefederal
' Section 102 (c)of the HousingAct of 1949 stipulatesthat the annualamount of the federalnotes and obligationsauthorireci for loansto local public agencies for urban redevelopment
may be increased byspecified amounts'upon a deter- snination by thePresident, after receivingadvice from theCouncil of Eco- nomic Advisersas to the general effectof such increaseupon the conditions in the building industryand upon thenational economy,that such action isin the public interest."Section 304 (a) ofthe Act containsidentical language in regard to themaximum amountof annual contributionswhich the Public Housing Authorityis authorizedto contract with localhousing authorities. (Public Law 171,81 Cong.)
66government, too, may have to borrow moneyand may have to
accommodate itself to changing conditions in the market for
capital funds. But it has means of influencing that market which
are beyond the powerof private financial institutions. The re-
straints on federal financing for housing or any other purposes are
less direct than those which operate on privatefinancial institu-
tions, and the choice of the use of federal funds foralternative
investments is a matter of public decision rather thanof relative
attractiveness of investment outlets.
In conclusion, it appears that the level and timing ofresidential
construction expenditures during the next few decades will depend
more on politicaldecisions than on the market-oriented decisions
which were controlling before the thirties. Governmentinterest
and activity in this field will attempt to maintain ahigh volume of
capital formation in residential construction, even in theface of
declining market demand. The test of the effectivenessof such a
policy under adverse conditions is yet to come.While it is true
that political decisions can modify the operationsof market forces,
history is also replete with instances in which economicforces have
modified the aspirations of the body politic.The most recent
example in the field of government aids to privateresidential con-
struction was the increase of maximum interest rates onVA and
FHA home loans to P/2 per cent in the springof 1953, which was
a belated adjustment tochanged conditions in capital markets as
well as a reflection of changed monetarypolicy.
In any event, governmental efforts tomaintain a high level of
residential building will most likely involve majorchanges in the
institutional arrangements for allocating funds to newbuilding
activity. Under the FHA and VA programsthe government to
date has sought to meet its objectives byincentive, persuasion, and
the assumption of risks. In thisframework, many of the existing
institutional arrangements in the creation andownership of resi-
dential mortgage debt have been preserved.There is a real ques-
tion whether these arrangements will or canhe maintained if the
public demand for new financial tools,such as direct lending by






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NOTEs TO TABLE 8:
Based on FHA first compliance inspections, excluding a small numbei of
new dwelling units financed underTitle I, Class 3 of the National Housing
Act.
Includes rental and cooperative housing projects and military housing (Sees.
207, 213, 608, and 803)Sec. 611 projects included under I- and 4-family
houses.
Estimated on basis of first mortgage loans guaranteed by VA prior to June
1950, since then based on VA first compliance inspection.
SouRcE: Housing and Home Finance Agency, HousingStatistics,January
1952, p. 38. The comparison between starts under the FHA and VA pmgrams
with total starts is only approximate in respect to units for owner-occupancy
and rental. In this comparison, one- and two-family houses reported by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics are assumed to be built for owner occupancy, and
units in three- or more family dwellings (multifamily structures) are assumed
to be built for rent. The classification of FHA starts by units in one- to four-
family houses and rental projects does not quite match the BLS classification.
Likewise, some of the new houses bought on VA guaranteed loans may contain
one or more dwelling units for rent. However, the proportion ofdwelling units
in FHA and VA financed two- to four-family houses (as against single-family
houses) has been very small. Finally, definitions of type of structure vary. For
example, a group of row houses for rent may be classified by FHA as a multi-
family (rental) housing project and by the IlLS as single-family houses.
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VA.GUARANTFFD LOANSFRA AND VA
Per CentAS rFR CENT
Amountof Total OF TOTAL
(3) (4) (5) 1935 94 4.2
,., 4.2 1936 309 13.4
13.4 1937 424 16.4 .. 16.4 1938 473 19.4 .. 19.4 1939 669 23.0
23.0
1940 736 21.0
.. 21.0 1941 890 22.6
22.6 1942 958 28.9
28.9 1943 762 22.7
.... 22.7 1944 707 17.7
17.7
1945
192 3. 13.6 1946 422 4.2 2302 23.0 27.2 1947 895 8.0 3,286 29,3 37.3 1948 2,109 18.6 1,881 16.6 35.2 1949 2,198 19.9 1,424 12.9 32.8
1950 2,489 15.5 3,073 19.2 34,7 1951 1,935 3,614
SOURCE, a' COLUMN:
(1) Housing and HomeFinance Agency, AnnualReport, 1950, Table4, p. 238, and Housing Sfa,j,i5January 1952,p. 48. Excludes a small amount of homemortgages insured under TitleI, Class 3. (2), (4) Totalsestimated by Home LoanBank Board, "EstimatedHome Mortgage Debt and LendingActivity, 1950." (3) Housing and HomeFinance Agency, AajReport, 1950, Table 18, p. 133, andHousing Sratisti5, January1952, p. 50. The 1945 figure includes smallamount of VA loans closed in1944. (5) Sum of Cots. 2 and4.TABLE1 0
FHA and VA Loans Held by Principal Types ofLenders
in Million Dollars and as PerCent of Their Residential Loans
Year.Ends, 1940-1 950
TOTAL FHA AND VA
END OF EISA AND VA RESIDENTiAL AS A PER CENT
YEAR MORTGAGES MORTGAGES' OF TOTAL
ALife Insurance Co,npanirsb
1940 $ 668 $ 2,887 23.1
1941 815 3,233 25.2
1942 1,096 3,625 30.2
1943 1,286 3,835 33.5
1944 1,408 3,819 36.9
1945 1,425 3,632 39.2
1946 1,484 4,021 36.9
1947 2,260 5,005 45.2
1948 3,482 6,754 51.6
1949 4,672 8,232 56.8
1950 6,597 11,035 59.8
B Mutual Savings Banks'
1947 807 3,937 20.5
1948 1,334 4,758 28.0
1949 L943 5,569 34.9
1950 3,006 7,054 42.6
CInsured Commercial Banksd
1950 4,799 9,344 51.4
D insured Savings and Loan Associationf
1947 2,025 6,592 30.7
1948 2,326 7,783 29.9
1949 2,658 9,037 29.4
1950 3,242 11,188 29.0
Totals a estimated in the forthcomingmonograph.
For FHA and VA mortgages: Instituteof Life Insurance, Life Insurance
Fact Books, except for 1945 and 1946, whichinclude rough estimates for VA
loan holdings. FHA holdings were $1,394million in 1945 and $1,228 million
in 1946.
For FHA and VA mortgages: Reports"Mutual Savings Bank Mortgage
Loan Activities" of the National Associationof Mutual Savings Banks.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, ReportNo. 33. Figures as of June 30.
Home Loan Bank Board, Statistical Summary,1950 and 1951.
71I
TABLE11
Transfers Among Mortgageesof FHA-Insured Home Loans
1935-1950
(dollaramounts in millions;numbersofloans in thousands)
'Face amount of loanspurchased and sold. Includesresajes but cxcluds inter- federal agency transfers.
bColumn I minus net purchasesor sales of federal agenciesas shown in Table 13.
Beginning 1949 data includemortgages insured under Sec. 603pursuant to See. 610.
na. - not available
















OF COL. 4 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1935-36 65 54 na.
1937 115 93 n.a.
1938 199 153 n.a.
1939 309 230 na.
1940 401 343 n.a.
1941 442 400 n.a.
1942 492 462 n.a.
1943 594 480 na.
1944 463 429 n.a.
1945 478 395 n.a.
1946
1947
266 244 56 940 6.0
1948
278 276 51 912 5.6
1949'
887 784 134 1,088 12.3
1950'
1,100 841 157 1.302 12.1










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































and Soles ofFHA loans on Onto Four-FamilyHouses by federalAgen5
l935-195Q
(amounts inthousands ofdoll05;
t- URC ISA S ES
Per cent of total purchaseand sales by allmortgagees, as shown fl Column I of Table 11.
'Less than 0.5 per cent.



































































1919 259,880 23.6 991 *
1950 82.432 5.8 211,591 14.9
Total $892,098 11,9 $559,466 7.4I
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TABLE1 3
Purchases and Sales of FHAcoons
on One- to Four-Family Houses
by Federal Agencics
1935-1950
(amounts in thousands of dollars)
Per cent of total purchaseand sales by all rnortgagees,as shown in column 1 of Table 11.
*Less than 0.5per Cent.



















1940 63,644 15.9 5,584 1.4 1941 47,184 10.7 4,762 1,1 1942 39,576 8.1 9,842 2.0 1943 41,568 7.0 156,004 26.3 1944 48,339 10.4 13,976 3.0
1945 20,848 .4 104,256 21.8 1946 910 * 23,095 8.7 1947 179 *
1,914 0.7 1948 104,264 11.8 1,461 *
1949 259,880 23.6 991
1950 82,432 5.8 211,591 14.9
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